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EDITORIAL 
supply chain are counterfeit/falsified while the European 
Union Intellectual Property office estimate that fake medi-
cines cost the pharmaceutical industry €10.2bn annually (3). 
These economic impacts have contributed to the introduction 
of the EU FMD (4, 5), which involves the serialisation of medi-
cines by manufacturers, and the systematic scanning of the 
unique identifier (UI) contained within the two-dimensional 
barcodes by dispensers. When a scan is performed, the prod-
uct is decommissioned; that is, data on the medicine packet 
are transmitted to a national database where they are cross-
checked against a database of known legitimate products, 
and is recorded as being dispensed. The information is then 
sent back to the terminal responsible for performing the scan. 
The terminal alerts the user to any warnings associated with 
that product. Warnings may include “medicine not found on 
the database,” “medicine expired,” “medicine soon to expire,” 
“medicine recalled,” “medicine has been falsified,” or “medi-
cine has been previously scanned elsewhere,” which should 
prompt staff to quarantine the affected product. This editorial 
describes the key implications of the EU FMD on UK dispens-
ers, and covers issues such as improving drug recalls, where 
to scan medicines, and who will pay for EU FMD changes.
Drug recalls
The identification of SF medicines in HICs usually results 
in government-led product recalls. In the UK, there were 11 
recalls of falsified medicines between 2001 and 2011 (6), 
and many more recalls relating to substandard medicines. 
 However, not all SF medicines are identified by government 
bodies, and even when they are, even the most efficient 
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Introduction
In May 2017, the World Health Organisation (WHO) ado-
pted the term substandard and falsified (SF) medicine in 
place of the previously used term, spurious/falsely-labelled/
falsified/counterfeit (SFFC). The new term, SF, covers both 
substandard and falsified medicines. According to the WHO, 
substandard medicines or “out of specification” medicines, are 
authorised medical products that fail to meet either their qual-
ity standards or specifications, or both (1). Falsified medicines 
are “medical products that deliberately/fraudulently misrep-
resent their identity, composition, or source” (1) and exist in 
illegal international online markets, low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs) as well as high income countries (HICs).
It is difficult to quantify the extent or the economic im-
pact of medicine falsification in Europe due to sparse preva-
lence data. However, there have been many cases throughout 
 Europe where falsified and substandard medicines have been 
identified in the legal supply chain. Some sources, such as the 
EU Falsified Medicines Directive (FMD) impact assessment, 
suggest that 0.005% (2) of medicines in the legal European 
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product recall process can never recuperate all examples. In 
the UK, the current recall system involves email communica-
tion from the UK Medicines and Healthcare Products Regu-
latory Agency (MHRA) directly to healthcare professionals 
and healthcare organisations. Historically, UK pharmacies 
or pharmacy departments within hospitals would print the 
MHRA email and attach it to a noticeboard or place it in the 
dispensary as a reminder, which results in staff searching for 
affected batches and having to remember the recall when 
checking medicines supplied by the pharmacy or brought 
into the healthcare facility by patients. In recent years, the 
process has been made more uniform, with pharmacies of-
ten documenting recalls and their actions taken, and discuss-
ing them in a monthly safety report. Even so, it is still very 
difficult to conduct patient-level recalls as specific medicine 
batches are not recorded when medicines are dispensed to 
individual patients. This gives rise to the opportunity for dan-
gerous recalled medicines to be used by patients. Healthcare 
professionals currently do not have the data required to make 
patient-level recalls feasible; this alone puts patients at risk 
of taking an SF medicine. The EU FMD not only involves the 
identification of falsified medicines, but also the mandated 
technological approach must be able to identify to the phar-
macist whether or not a medicine is expired or recalled at the 
point of dispensing to the patient. This will add an extra level 
of security beyond the current email alert system. Moving be-
yond this, if configured correctly, hospitals may be capable of 
attaching this UI serial code to a patient record. This would be 
a tremendous advantage to public health and would revolu-
tionize the patient-level drug recall process.
Primary and secondary care
Community pharmacies in Belgium, Italy, and Greece have 
been scanning medicines at the point of dispensing for many 
years with apparent success. However, the scanning of medi-
cines in secondary care is a new concept, and each European 
country operates separately for legal reasons or due to varia-
tions in hospital size and the services they offer. Furthermore, 
primary care and secondary care have different systems for 
the dispensing, sale, and reimbursement of medicines. A 
number of key questions will need answering before EU FMD 
implementation, and two of the most practical and pertinent 
questions for dispensers relate to the operational impact and 
cost of implementation; namely, (i) Where to scan? and (ii) 
Who will pay?
Primary care
Where to scan?
The EU FMD states that the decommissioning of medi-
cines (scanning) must be carried out at the point of dispens-
ing in the community. Many government bodies have not 
made it clear if this means the point at which the medicine 
is dispensed, checked, bagged, or handed out to the patient. 
Using the UK as an example, authentication at any stage 
has downstream repercussions for the dispenser (Tab. I). 
This added step to the dispensing process is sure to disrupt 
work processes, at least initially, in the UK and European 
 pharmacies.
TAbLE I - The different stages within a community pharmacy dispensary where decommissioning could occur
Stage Advantages Disadvantage
Labelling 
Stage
The terminal used to label the product may be used to  
perform the medicine scan, relinquishing the need for  
additional authentication terminals. 
Unsuitable medicines are identified early in the process.  
This provides the pharmacy with a better chance of procur-
ing a replacement medicine to satisfy the patients drug 
order, should the product in stock be identified as SF
Authenticating at this stage may slow down the labeling 
process by occupying a terminal for a longer period of time. 
If performed at this stage, this task may be performed by a 
less qualified member of staff, which may compromise the 
quarantine process
Dispensing 
Stage
Unsuitable medicines are identified early in the process.  
This provides the pharmacy with a better chance of  
procuring a replacement medicine should the product in 
stock be identified as SF
This staff grade may be less qualified to deal with SF medi-
cines. Decommissioning at this stage may require a financial 
outlay for additional computer terminals for product  
decommissioning
Checking 
Stage
SF medicines are identified by highly trained registered 
professionals. Identification occurs closer to the patient, 
reducing the risk of adulteration between the moment  
of authentication and the moment of supply.
SF medicines are identified at one of the last points before 
supply to the patient. If the medicine is recalled and an 
 alternative product is unavailable, this may cause disruption 
to patient supply. Medicines that are checked may be  
placed in storage for up to one month before collection, in 
which time a medicine could expire or be identified as  
recalled
Handing-Out 
Stage
Medicines are verified as safe at the final stage before  
reaching the public. 
Authentication technology can be configured to send  
counselling alerts to the healthcare assistant, which  
facilitates patient education and counselling
Medicines identified as unsuitable for the public at this stage 
may cause inconvenience to patients if there is no replace-
ment stock available. This step would be carried out by the 
least qualified staff members, which may increase the inad-
vertent supply of an SF medicine to a patient.
SF = substandard and falsified.
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Who will pay?
The EU FMD states that manufacturers must pay for the 
medicines’ authentication technology and national data-
bases, but it will be the responsibility of the pharmacy itself 
to pay for staff education and hardware, such as scanners 
and additional computer terminals that may be required. 
 Although most dispensers in the UK have scanners within 
their practice for scanning electronic prescriptions, some dis-
pensers will not and others will require updating.
Mainland Europe differs to the UK as not all dispensers 
have electronic stock recording systems or patient medication 
record systems used for dispensing. It is likely that dispensers 
without an electronic dispensing system or record-keeping 
system will have to invest in a computer terminal and scanner 
to facilitate the decommissioning of medicines in compliance 
with EU FMD regulations. This will be a significant expense for 
those currently lacking this information technology (IT) infra-
structure. Some UK pharmacies may have this infrastructure 
in place due to the electronic prescribing agenda in the UK, 
but in busy stores there may be a requirement for additional 
terminals and scanners.
Where the appropriate infrastructure is not present, there 
will be financial pressures. This will be in addition to reduced 
payments to many UK pharmacies from the phasing out of es-
tablishment payments (7), a reduction in the global sum (8), 
and a cut to category M reimbursement (9).
Secondary care
Hospitals face a similar challenge to the community sec-
tor dispensers; however, these challenges are further com-
plicated by the number and variety of companies that supply 
medicine to hospitals, the complexities of their work, and the 
diversity of drug movement within the hospital (10). The big-
gest difference between community and hospital EU FMD re-
quirements relate to the point at which the medicine requires 
decommissioning.
Where to scan?
The EU FMD allows for the verification of a product’s 
unique identifier at any stage of the drug supply chain in any 
sector. In contrast to the community pharmacy sector, where 
medicines must be decommissioned at the point of dispens-
ing, the hospital sector is permitted to decommission at any 
point before dispensing the product to the patient (Tab. II) (4). 
However, the EU FMD includes an article which explains that 
all medicines decommissioned can only have their status re-
verted within 10 days of decommissioning. If medicines are 
10 days past the point at which they are decommissioned, 
then those medicines can only be used within the healthcare 
institution that they have been decommissioned from and 
cannot be sold to another organisation. Although there is an 
option to decommission medicinal products when they are re-
ceived from suppliers i.e “goods in stage”, this would likely re-
quire the employment of further pharmacy procurement staff 
to conduct this exercise. Unless a two-stream product system 
was created (one stream for wholesaling and one stream for 
hospital patient requests), this would restrict hospitals that 
profit from wholesale dealing (e.g., to community hospitals, 
hospices, or other hospitals) as any medicine decommission 
greater than 10 days previously would not be permitted to be 
sold to any other organisation (10).
A study was conducted which identifies the checking 
stage of prescription processing as one of the most appropri-
ate points in the hospital setting to decommission medicines 
(11), based on scanning compliance data. The study results 
explain that checking staff comply with the medicine authen-
tication process a little better than their dispensing counter-
parts. This, coupled with the reality that all checking staff 
(accuracy-checking technicians and pharmacists) are trained 
and experienced with the identification of errors, and are all 
registered with a professional body (which brings with it the 
potential for professional repercussions for making errors), 
makes this a reasonable stage to consider for decommission-
ing in the hospital pharmacy.
Who will pay?
Generally speaking, hospitals will have to pay for the edu-
cation and training of their staff, the adjustments to work-
flows, and the purchase of additional hardware to facilitate 
the EU directive. Each European government is likely to react 
differently, and it is anticipated that some governments may 
provide financial support to facilitate compliance; however, 
this is unlikely. For the most part, the cost of compliance will 
be shouldered by the pharmacy departments within hospi-
tals in the UK and across the European Union.
Preparation for the EU FMD deadline
Verification technology
Within the literature, there exists a study by Simoens (12), 
which assessed medicine authentication in the community 
pharmacy sector and showed that, in practice, the process 
can be effective. When we consider that Greece, Belgium, 
and Italy have been scanning medicines for several years, this 
is not surprising. A study published in 2016 by Naughton et al 
(11) demonstrates the effectiveness of the EU FMD mandat-
ed medicines decommissioning technology in a hospital en-
vironment, which assesses the authentication and detection 
rates. Naughton et al (11) places this research into the gen-
eral context of health information technology and compares 
their findings with a systematic review by Shojania et al (13). 
Naughton explains how the concept of “Active” alerts identi-
fied in Shojania et al’s study ties in with staff suggestions to 
add an “Active” alert to the proposed EU FMD technology to 
improve the detection rate of this approach (14). It is antici-
pated that the proposed medicine authentication technolo-
gies may not be suitable as a one-size-fits-all, and may require 
a level of customization to suit the different environments 
that they will be used in; namely, manufacturers, wholesal-
ers, community pharmacies, and hospital pharmacies.
National Medicines Verification Organisation (NMVO)
Each EU country must create a not-for-profit organisa-
tion called the National Medicines Verification Organisation 
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(NMVO). It is the responsibility of the NMVO to select a veri-
fication provider from the two available providers, Arvato Sys-
tems GmbH and Solidsoft Reply (15). These companies put 
themselves forward and were selected by the European Medi-
cines Verification Organisation (EMVO) in 2015 to provide a 
blueprint system to comply with the EU FMD. This blueprint 
was developed based on the FMD and feedback from many dif-
ferent European pharmaceutical and healthcare stakeholders.
An NMVO is in place in 26 of the 28 European countries, 
and many have signed contracts with either of the two medi-
cine authentication providers (16). These providers will work 
with the NMVO in each country to develop and deploy a 
national IT system to facilitate medicine verification. Each 
country will have its own individual database (referred to as 
the spoke), and this database (managed by the verification 
provider and overseen by the NMVO) will feed into a central 
European database (referred to as the hub), which is under 
the supervision of the EMVO. The verification providers and 
respective NMVOs have a tremendous task ahead. They are 
required to load serialized drug codes into the national medi-
cines verification databases, and ensure that the technology 
is communicating to wholesalers and pharmacies around the 
EU before February 2019. Noncompliance will not be accept-
able, but the deadline for enforcement has the potential to 
change. In the USA, we observe that the Drug Supply Chain 
Security Act manufacturer serialisation enforcement dead-
line date has been pushed back by one year, from November 
27, 2017 to November 26, 2018 (17). As EU FMD preparation 
appears slow, we may yet see the same delay in Europe.
Added value
The forward-thinking healthcare professional will be 
glad to know that the EU FMD does not signal all doom and 
gloom: there is value in the EU FMD. Some hospitals, such as 
the  Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, are in-
terested in getting as much value per scan as possible. These 
hospitals plan to look at using the proposed system for post-
marketing surveillance, patient-led recalls, nurse-led scan-
ning at the point of administration, patient safety, and better 
stock management. These advantages are important, and if 
time was in abundance the author would advise that all hos-
pitals strive for these gains (18). Considering the time to com-
pliance is less than 15 months from now, the best that can be 
expected is an authentication service that is built to facilitate 
the incorporation of added value in the future. Although the 
potential advantages and opportunities are unlikely to be 
implemented across the board in time for the February 2019 
deadline, there is no reason why an individual organisation 
cannot build in “EU FMD value” themselves.
TAbLE II - The different stages within a hospital pharmacy where decommissioning could occur
Stage Advantages Disadvantage
Goods In SF products are identified upon receipt from the whole-
saler and issues can be rectified early in the drug supply 
chain. The decommissioning process is completed  
without an impact on frontline services
Scanning drugs by workers in the hospital pharmacy stores 
department would be a new process that may require fur-
ther staff numbers to carry out the activity. Subsequent to 
scanning at goods in, medicines may be recalled or expire. 
As they would not be scanned again before dispensing to a 
patient, this would increase the risk of supplying a patient 
with an expired or recalled drug
Labelling Stage As per Tab. I As per Tab. I
Dispensing Stage As per Tab. I. Also, some hospitals have a process where 
labels are not produced until the correct medicine is 
scanned. Incorporating the scanning of the 2D  
data-matrix at this point adds no additional time to that 
process while complying to the EU FMD
As per Tab. I
Checking Stage As per Tab. I. Many UK hospitals are familiar with  
scanning prescriptions at this stage to facilitate  
prescription tracking in the hospital. Therefore, scanning 
medicines at the same time could be incorporated
As per Tab. I. Also, hospital dispensaries in the UK largely 
dispense for the same day and have less flexibility in man-
aging their workload, unlike in community where monthly 
prescriptions can be dispensed in advance. Scanning drugs 
as part of the dispensing process may prove burdensome 
during busy periods
Handing-Out 
Stage
As per Tab. I. As hospitals deal with more specialist and 
often rarely used medicines supplied to outpatients, it  
can be difficult to remember counselling advice associated 
with these medicines. A scan at this stage may generate 
drug information to remind staff of specific, less frequent 
used specialist medicines advice. Handing out of medicines 
within hospitals in the UK is often conducted by accredited 
checking technicians and pharmacists, thus decreasing the 
likelihood of exposing less qualified staff to this task
As per Tab. I. Exception, lesser qualified staff do not 
routinely hand out medicines directly to patients. In ad-
dition, patients do not always collect medicines from the 
pharmacy department. Medicines can be collected by 
ward-based nurses or porters, which further complicates 
the process
2D = 2-dimensional; EU FMD = European Union Falsified Medicines Directive; SF = substandard and falsified.
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Conclusion
The EU FMD was first published in 2011; however, there 
was not much preparation by hospital and community phar-
macies in the immediate years that followed. The road to 
compliance is now shorter than one would hope, and indus-
try-wide compliance will be difficult before the 2019 dead-
line. Healthcare professionals can prepare by budgeting for 
the costs associated with the EU FMD, deciding on where to 
scan in their organisation and re-evaluating their dispens-
ing workflows to facilitate the added decommissioning step. 
There may be a delay in the enforcement date, as seen in the 
USA; however, currently, there is no set plan for an extend-
ed deadline; therefore dispensers must aim for compliance 
by February 2019. Clear guidance to outline the expecta-
tions from European government organisations, such as the 
 national medicines regulatory authorities and departments 
of health, would help tremendously to ensure that compli-
ance is safely reached before the February 2019 deadline.
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